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The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) was a temporary cash transfer program for 
workers who had reduced earnings due to the COVID-19 pandemic over the period of March 15 
and October 2, 2020. While the benefits of getting the CERB out the door as quickly as possible 
should not be understated, the speed with which the CERB was rolled out led to the program 
being implemented without clear objectives, the nature of the benefit not defined, and no time for 
detailed negotiations within and across governments as to how the CERB would be treated not 
only related to eligibility for other programs, but also the benefit levels delivered by these 
programs. There are three possible ways in which the CERB could be treated by these various 
programs: as an employment insurance benefit, as working income, or as a benefit payment. 
Each of these different ways of treating the CERB has different implications for eligibility and 
for the level of benefit from other government programs. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine how the failure to provide a universal definition of the CERB led to it being treated 
differently, not only across governments, but also differently by various programs within a given 
government. We will show that what might have appeared to be a minor technical administrative 
oversight led to confusion by CERB beneficiaries who were also collecting other government 
benefits over program interaction effects that differed depending on which jurisdiction the CERB 
beneficiary lived.  
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Within Canada, both the federal government and provincial/territorial governments administer 
and deliver income and social supports. Sometimes these income and social support programs 
interact with others in ways that affect eligibility and benefit levels. In this chapter, we look at 
one such interaction that arose during the COVID-19 pandemic: the interaction between 
provincial/territorial income assistance programs (sometimes called “welfare”) and the federal 
Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB).  
 
The CERB was an important source income support during COVID-19: it rapidly provided much 
needed cash transfers for those negatively affected by the pandemic. As impressive as the CERB 
was, due to its quick roll-out, there were no federal/provincial/territorial agreements in place 
regarding the program, particularly how provinces and territories should treat the CERB income 
for the purposes of their other income and support programs. This meant the answer to this 
question was left up to each provincial/territorial income assistance program and different 
jurisdictions treated the income from the CERB differently.  
 
To understand how to answer the question of ‘what the income was from the CERB’ consider the 
general framework of how various forms of income can be treated with respect to 
provincial/territorial income assistance programs. For income assistance applicants and 
recipients, they are only eligible for income assistance if their qualifying, or “non-exempt”, 
income is below an income threshold and, while receiving income assistance, their level of 
qualifying income then affects their income assistance benefit level. What counts as qualifying 
income depends on the origin of the income being considered. For example, earned income and 
benefits from the Canada Pension Plan are included in qualifying income, albeit differentially as 
we will discuss shortly, whereas income received from the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) is 
exempted from qualifying income.  
 
The main reason for differentiating amongst various forms of income for eligibility and 
maintenance of income assistance benefits is primarily because provincial income assistance 
programs are considered to be ‘funders of last resort.’ Before accessing income assistance 
benefits, most other forms of income and wealth should be used first, thereby creating a wall to 
keep those with other options out of the program. There are some caveats to this, with full 
exemptions mainly granted for income that is intended to reduce child poverty (e.g., CCB) or 
partial exemptions granted for income from employment to incentivize labour market 
participation. The reason income assistance programs allow recipients to earn some amount of 
employment income without being completely cut off of income assistance is to address a 
phenomenon known as the ‘welfare wall;’ the state where many income assistance recipients can 
end up worse off if they accept paid work because they lose access to income assistance benefits. 
As noted by Petit and Tedds (2021a), income assistance programs across Canada are designed so 
that recipients who accept employment are not completely cut off of income assistance. Instead, 
they have their benefits reduced, usually less than dollar for dollar as they begin to earn income.  
 
What does this mean for the CERB? Had the CERB been designated specifically as akin to a tax 
benefit program to support low income individuals, like the CCB, the CERB would not have 
been included in income assistance qualifying income thereby allowing income assistance clients 
who received the CERB to remain eligible for income assistance and keep their full income 
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assistance benefits.2 On the other hand, had the CERB been designated specifically as lost 
earnings, the CERB would have been treated the same as earned income for the purpose of 
qualifying income in income assistance programs, resulting in a ‘partial exemption’ of the 
CERB. That is, for income assistance recipients who received the CERB, they may have 
remained eligible for income assistance and had their income assistance benefits clawed back by 
the same amount that usual employment earnings are clawed back. Finally, had the CERB been 
specifically designated as akin to an employment insurance program, the full amount of the 
CERB would have been included in qualifying income. Since most income assistance income 
thresholds are lower than the CERB, the majority of income assistance clients receiving the 
CERB would have become ineligible for income assistance. 
  
Leaving this technical specification up to each jurisdiction led to different treatments of the 
CERB for income assistance clients depending on their province/territory of residence, as shown 
in Figure 1. British Columbia, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories all fully exempted the 
CERB for their income assistance clients. Alberta (Alberta Works), Manitoba, Ontario, and 
Quebec all partially exempted the CERB. Finally, Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces all 
did not exempt the CERB, resulting in the majority of income assistance recipients who collected 
the CERB becoming ineligible for income assistance. The purpose of this chapter is to consider 
the implications of this differential treatment. 
 
Figure 1: Treatment of CERB for Income Assistance Recipients Across Canada 
 
 
2 Generally, tax benefits are explicitly excluded by regulation from the calculation of qualifying income for the 
purposes of determining eligibility and benefits of social assistance recipients. Exempt tax benefits include the 
Canada Child Benefit, provincial child tax credits, the Canada Workers Benefit, the federal GST/HST credit, 
provincial sales tax credits, and federal and provincial climate tax credits.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining the pertinent details of the CERB 
program which is followed by detailing how provincial/territorial income assistance programs 
determine eligibility for and the benefit level of these programs based on types of income. We 
then integrate the information from these two programs to detail the interactions between income 
assistance programs and the CERB along with the implications for provincial/territorial income 
assistance caseloads. We finish by discussing the implications for income assistance programs, 
specifically, as well as program design more generally.  
 
The Canada Emergency Response Benefit: Program Details 
The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) was one part of Canada’s COVID-19 
Economic Response Plan: it was a temporary income support program for workers who had 
significantly reduced employment earnings due to COVID-19. It was announced on 18 March 
2020 by the Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Prime Minister of Canada 2020b) and legislation 
received royal assent on 25 March 2020 (Bill C-13 2020) though further amendments to the 
program were released on 15 April 2020 that shored up some gaps that had been identified 
(Department of Finance 2020). Applications for the CERB were accepted beginning 6 April 
2020 for the previous month (Employment and Social Development Canada 2020a).  
To be eligible for the CERB, a person must have been a worker who was at least 15 years of age, 
a resident of Canada, and who either in 2019 or in the 12 months prior to the CERB application 
had earned at least $5,000 from employment, self-employment, EI benefits, or other payments 
related to pregnancy, new-born children, or adoption (Government of Canada 2020c, s.2). In 
addition, the worker had to have ceased working for reasons related to COVID-19, and not 
voluntarily, for at least 14 consecutive days within the four-week period for which they are 
applying for the benefit for and during that four-week period they could not earn more than 
$1,000 (Government of Canada 2020b, s. 6; 2020e, 2020d).  
 
Those who applied for the CERB received $2,000 for each four-week period, regardless of their 
actual lost income (Government of Canada 2020f). The maximum number of weeks the CERB 
could be claimed for was initially set at 16 weeks, but it was eventually extended to 24 weeks, 
and then again to 28 weeks (Prime Minister of Canada 2020a; Employment and Social 
Development Canada 2020b). An eligible person had to re-apply every four weeks to receive an 
additional four-week installment of CERB, re-attesting that they met the eligibility conditions. In 
total, a person could have received up to $14,000 in CERB benefits if they applied every four 
weeks. The CERB was a taxable benefit; however, the tax on the CERB was not deducted at the 
source meaning that taxes owing on the CERB were assessed upon completion of a 2020 tax 
return (Golombek 2020).  
 
To deliver payments to Canadians in a fast and simple manner, the CERB application was 
available jointly through both Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Service Canada (through the 
EI program). The application was online and was short and simple: there were no supporting 
documents needing to be submitted at time of application to prove eligibility. At the time of 
application, eligibility was not adjudicated, an adjudication system that has become known as 
‘trust, then verify’ (Robson 2020). This allowed the CRA/Service Canada to process the 
application and provide a payment within 10 days of the application. When eligibility was 
verified, those who were not eligible but received a payment had to pay back what they 
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erroneously received; however, there will be no penalty (e.g., interest payable) (Government of 
Canada 2020c, s. 14). As have been well reported, the verification process began in Fall 2020 
and ramped up following the filing of 2020 tax returns (Canada Revenue Agency 2020). 
 
As of October 4, 2020, the end date for the CERB program, there were 8.9 million unique 
applicants to the CERB, with 27.57 million applications received and 27.56 million applications 
processed. In total, $81.64 billion was paid out in CERB benefits (Government of Canada 
2020a). This is more than the original cost estimate provided by the Office of the Parliamentary 
Budget Officer which projected in June 2020 that the CERB would cost $53.4 billion (Perrault 
and Worswick 2020). 
  
Income Assistance Programs 
Each province administers and delivers its own provincial income assistance program. Often 
called “welfare”, these programs provide a monthly cash transfer to persons who have assets and 
income below a specified threshold. Often, these programs also offer clients access to a host of 
other in-kind supports, such as health benefits and employment supports. In this section, we 
specifically examine the income assistance portion of these programs, leaving out a more 
detailed discussion of other in-kind benefits. 
Generally, provinces offer two separate “streams” of income assistance: a temporary stream 
under which recipients are expected to return to work in the short or medium term, and a 
disability stream for persons with (verified) disabilities. For both streams, applicants and 
recipients are required to prove that their qualifying, or “non-exempt”, income is below a 
specified income threshold. The income threshold is the maximum benefit amount that a 
recipient may receive if eligible for provincial income assistance. The maximum benefit amount 
differs by province, stream (e.g., temporary assistance or disability assistance), family type, 
family size, and ability to work. Non-exempt income generally includes all income received 
minus any permitted deductions and exemptions (which are discussed in more detail blow).  
 
The general idea of income assistance is that, to determine eligibility and the benefit amount, 
non-exempt income is compared to the maximum benefit amount. If an applicant’s/recipient’s 
non-exempt income is less than the maximum benefit amount, the applicant/recipient is eligible 
for provincial income assistance and their benefit amount is then calculated by subtracting their 
non-exempt income from the maximum benefit amount they would otherwise be eligible for. 
 
The calculation of both the maximum benefit amount and non-exempt income is complex, 
relying on sources of income and distinctions of income that are not just found on, for example, 
an annual tax form. The detailed calculation is shown in Petit and Tedds (2020a) and we 
summarize their work here.  
 
The complexity arises in that there are two separate categories of non-exempt income, each of 
which are treated differently in how they factor into the calculation for eligibility and benefit 
amount, and this varies across jurisdictions. The first category of non-exempt income is non-
exempt earned income. To arrive at non-exempt earned income, gross earned income is first 
adjusted downwards by applying various deductions to arrive a net earned incomed. Deductions 
include mandatory earnings deductions like EI and CPP contributions that are deducted at 
source. Net earned income is then further adjusted downwards by applying the earnings 
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exemption. Earnings exemptions are calculated by first determining the earnings exemption 
threshold. Any net earned income below that threshold is exempted and any earnings above the 
earnings exemption threshold are subjected to a ‘phase-out’ rate. In other words, any net earned 
income below the earnings exemption threshold is considered “exempt income” and does not 
factor into the calculation for the benefit amount. And some net earned income above the 
earnings exemption threshold is partially exempted while the remaining is non-exempt income 
and reduces the benefit amount. 
 
For example, suppose that the maximum benefit amount is $1,000/month, the earnings 
exemption threshold is $200/month, and the phase-out rate is 75%. An income assistance 
recipient earning $100/month in net earnings would be eligible for income assistance and would 
receive a monthly benefit amount of $1,000/month as their non-exempt earnings (=$100) are 
below the earnings exemption threshold. Comparatively, an income assistance recipient earning 
$500/month would also be eligible for income assistance and would receive a monthly benefit 
amount of $775 (= $1,000 – ($500 - $200)*0.75). Finally, an income assistance recipient earning 
$2,000/month would have non-exempt earnings of $1,350. Because $1,350 is greater than the 
maximum benefit amount of $1,000, this person would not be eligible for income assistance and 
receive a monthly benefit amount of $0. 
The second category of non-exempt income is “other” income. Other income includes anything 
from dividend income, interest income, investment income, court settlements, spousal and child 
supports, tax refunds, benefit income, rental income, and so on. To arrive at non-exempt other 
income, similar to earned income, the first step is to adjust gross other income for deductions to 
arrive at net other income. Deductions include deductions at source for any of the other income 
sources along with recognized costs of earning that income, such as essential operating costs 
related to earning rental income. Then any exemptions are deducted from net other income. 
Exemptions are specifically included in income assistance legislation and can include things like 
tax refunds, Canada Child Benefits, and child support payments. These exemptions differ by 
province and program. 
 
Once both non-exempt earned income and non-exempt other income are calculated, they are 
added together and compared to the maximum benefit amount to determine eligibility for income 
assistance and the benefit amount, as discussed above. 
 
Interactions Between CERB and Income Assistance 
We now turn to how this matters for the CERB. As noted above, income assistance recipients are 
not only expected but also encouraged to work. This means that during the first-wave of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, some persons who lost employment were income assistance recipients and 
were potentially eligible for the CERB. Because some income assistance recipients were eligible 
for the CERB, this made it necessary for each income assistance program to determine how to 
treat the CERB for eligibility and benefit amount purposes for both applicants and recipients. 
That is, they had to determine:  
 
• Whether applicants to income assistance who were also receiving the CERB were eligible 
to enter into income assistance at all. 
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• How to classify CERB income for current income assistance recipients. In particular, each 
provincial income assistance program had to determine if CERB was earned income or 
other income. If treated as earned income, the CERB would be subject to earnings 
exemptions already in place. If CERB was designated as “other” income, the provincial 
income assistance program then had to determine whether there were any associated 
exemptions.  
 
With respect to the first decision, all provincial/territorial income assistance programs 
determined that for applicants to income assistance who were receiving the CERB, they would 
not be eligible for income assistance (at least at the time of CERB receipt). 
 
With respect to the second decision, reviewing income assistance program material from across 
Canada, different jurisdictions classified the CERB differently. Ultimately, what type of income 
the CERB was and whether it was exempted was determined by each jurisdiction separately, 
which then impacted the income assistance eligibility and benefit amount for each jurisdiction 
differently. Income assistance programs could choose from three routes as discussed above: fully 
exempt, partially exempt, or not exempt. If the CERB was fully exempt then the CERB had no 
impact on income assistance eligibility or benefit amounts for current recipients: recipients 
received both their full income assistance benefit amount and the full CERB amount. If the 
CERB was partially exempt then the CERB may or may not have affected eligibility for income 
assistance: whether it did or not is dependent on the relative size of the exemption compared to 
the size of the maximum benefit amount. If the CERB was not exempt, then persons receiving 
the CERB had their income assistance benefits reduced to zero—they became ineligible for 
income assistance.  
 
Table 1 provides details on how each income assistance program by province classified the 
CERB for their current recipients. British Columbia (B.C.), the Yukon, and the Northwest 
Territories (NWT) all fully exempted the CERB. That is, the CERB had no impact on income 
benefits or eligibility of current income assistance recipients. In these jurisdictions, income 
assistance recipients received the full amount of their income benefits in the months they 
received CERB (along with the full CERB). 
 
On the other hand, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and PEI chose 
not to exempt CERB. They treated the CERB as other income that was completely non-exempt, 
From Table 1, for single adults in these jurisdictions, the non-exempt amount of the CERB 
exceeded the maximum benefit amount, thus all single adult CERB recipients became ineligible 
for income assistance and had their income benefits reduced to zero. 
 
Finally, Table 1 shows that jurisdictions that partially exempted the CERB had mixed effects on 
income assistance recipients. Alberta decided to treat CERB income as ‘passive business 
income’, which is a form of gross other income for AISH clients, with a partial exemption of 
$725/month resulting in a non-exempt amount of $1,275 (=$2,000-$725). Because the maximum 
benefit for single adults receiving AISH is $1,685, single adult AISH clients continued to receive 



















Effect of CERB receipt 
on income assistance 









Temporary Assistance Exempt other 
income  
Fully Exempt 
$760 $0 No effect $760  
Disability Assistance $1,183.42 $0 No effect $1,183.42 
Alberta 
Alberta Works (AW) 
Partially exempt 
earned income  
$230 exempt, 
remaining 25% exempt 
(75% claw back rate) 
$745 $1,327.50 Ineligible $0 








remaining 25% exempt 
(75% claw back rate) 
$1,685 $1,275 No effect $410 
Saskatchewan 
Income Support (SIS) 
Non-exempt other 
income  
Deducted 1-for-1 from 
benefits  
$860 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
Assured Income for 
Disability (SAID) 




earned income  
$200 is exempt, 
remaining 30% is 
exempt (70% claw 
back rate). 
$771 $1,260 Ineligible $0 
EIA (disabilities) $1,039.50 $1,260 Ineligible $0 
Ontario 
Ontario Works (OW) 
Partially exempt 
earned income 
Amount less than 




back at 50% 




$1,169 $900 No effect $269 
Quebec Social Assistance $710 $1,800 Ineligible $0 
 
3 Just because an income assistance recipient became ineligible for the income transfer portion of social assistance (due to CERB), does not necessarily mean 
they became ineligible for social assistance generally. For example, in Ontario, for social assistance recipients who became ineligible for income assistance, they 
retained access to health supports also provided to Ontario Works/ODSP recipients. (Durrani 2020) 
 8 
Sociale Solidarite  
Partially exempt 
earned income  
$200 is exempt, 
remainder will be 
clawed back at 100% 
$1,088 $1,800 Ineligible $0 
Nova Scotia IA  
Non-exempt other 
income  
Deducted 1-for-1 from 
benefits 
$586 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
Disability Support 
Program 
$850 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
New Brunswick Transitional Assistance Non-exempt other 
income  
Deducted 1-for-1 from 
benefits 
$564 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
Enhanced Assistance $797 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
Newfoundland Income Support Non-exempt other 
income  
Deducted 1-for-1 from 
benefits 
$906 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
Income Support (PWD) $906 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
PEI Social Assistance Non-exempt other 
income  
Deducted 1-for-1 from 
benefits 
$988 $2,000 Ineligible $0 
AccessAbility Supports $1,163 $2,000 Ineligible $0 















IA Exempt other 
income  
Fully Exempt 
$1,939 $0 No effect $1,939 
IA (PWD) $2,383 $0 No effect $2,383 
 
Notes: all numbers presented here are for single adults who own/rent their place of residence. The first program presented for each province is 
transitional/temporary assistance for those expected to work. The second program presented for each province is for persons with disabilities.  
Source: Adapted from Petit and Tedds (2020a), Tables 1 and 2. 
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Ontario, Manitoba, Quebec, and Alberta Works all chose to treat CERB income as earned 
income subject to their earnings exemption. For single adults in these jurisdictions, except for 
single adult ODSP clients in Ontario, the earnings exemption was such that the maximum benefit 
was less than the non-exempt CERB income. This means that, for all of these income assistance 
recipients, they became ineligible for income assistance and had their income benefits reduced to 
zero if they received the CERB.  For example, for single adult income assistance recipients in 
Manitoba, the earnings exemption was $740 (= $200 + ($2000 − $200) ∗ 0.3 =  $740) so that 
non-exempt income from the CERB was $1,260 (=$2,000-$740). Because $1,260 exceeds the 
maximum benefit amount for single adults (= $771), these persons received zero income 
assistance benefits.    
 
Income Assistance Caseloads 
The discussion above posits that to the extent that income assistance recipients in a province 
earned income, experienced earnings disruptions due to COVID-19, and received the CERB, 
their eligibility for income assistance was affected differently depending on the jurisdiction in 
which they lived. This in turn likely affected income assistance caseloads during the COVID-19 
pandemic when the CERB was operational. In particular, based on Table 1, we expect to see 
little change in caseloads in British Columbia, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories, but 
potentially large negative caseload effects in the other provinces conditional on the proportion of 
income assistance recipients who work while on benefits.  
 
To investigate this, we examine trends in caseload data from five provinces: B.C., Alberta, 
Ontario, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador. These five provinces were chosen 
because they were the only five for which income assistance caseload data was obtainable. 
Fortunately, these five provinces allow us to examine the potential effect of all three of the 
different treatments of the CERB on caseloads: B.C. fully exempted the CERB, Alberta and 
Ontario partially exempted the CERB, and New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador did 
not exempt the CERB. However, before looking at the caseload data, we first look at, in these 
five provinces, the potential proportion of income assistance recipients that were potentially 
eligible for the CERB. 
 
Table 2, adapted from Petit and Tedds (2020a), shows the estimated proportion of income 
assistance recipients in 2020 by province who were potentially eligible for the CERB. It should 
be noted that this data does not come from the provincial income assistance programs themselves 
but rather from the Social Policy Simulation Database (SPSD), a statistically representative 
database of Canadians curated by Statistics Canada: the COVID version was used so that CERB 
eligibility could be estimated. To create the SPSD data, data from the Canadian Income Survey 
is used. This data under-reports income assistance recipients and benefits and does not include 
disability status. 
 
From Table 2, we observe that B.C. and Alberta both have over 20% of their income assistance 
recipients who were potentially eligible for the CERB. Ontario has just under 20% of their 
income assistance recipients who were potentially eligible for the CERB, and New Brunswick 
and Newfoundland and Labrador have less than 10% of their income assistance recipients who 
were potentially eligible for the CERB. Thus, because New Brunswick and Newfoundland and 
Labrador have smaller proportions of income assistance recipients potentially eligible for the 
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CERB, even though they did not exempt the CERB, we expect to see only a small decline in 
their caseloads compared to Alberta and Ontario who partially exempted the CERB (effectively 
making most income assistance recipients receiving the CERB ineligible for income assistance). 
 
 




Number of individuals 
receiving provincial 
income assistance 
Number of income 
assistance recipients 
potentially eligible for 
CERB 
Percent of income assistance 
recipients potentially eligible 
for CERB 
BC 218,789 62,234 28.44% 
AB 212,480 46,911 22.08% 
ON 835,823 164,882 19.73% 
NB 29,481 2,866 9.72% 
NFLD 20,796 919 4.42% 
Source: Adapted from Petit and Tedds (2020a), Table 3. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 plot the percentage change in income assistance caseloads relative to April 2020 
(the first month CERB was collected) for the five provinces noted above. Figure 2 includes 
temporary assistance programs for those expected to work. Figure 3 includes income assistance 
programs for persons with disabilities who are not expected to work but who are nevertheless 
supported in employment. There are two notes to make. First, Newfoundland and Labrador 
temporary assistance and disability assistance caseloads are reported together. Thus, we include 
Newfoundland and Labrador caseload only in Figure 2, noting that the data for temporary and 
disability assistance are combined. Second, these figures are for all family types, not just single 
adults (unlike Table 1). 
 
From these figures, we see varying patterns of changes in caseload after the receipt of CERB 
started. From Figure 2, we see that after the receipt of CERB began, temporary assistance 
caseloads decreased. In both Alberta and Ontario where CERB was partially exempt (but had the 
effect of making single adults ineligible for income assistance nevertheless), we see the largest 
drops in the temporary assistance caseloads. The caseload for Alberta works declined by 25% 
between April 2020 and September 2020, from 61,060 cases to 45,725 cases. Likewise, the 
caseload for Ontario Works fell by 15% between April 2020 and September 2020 from 251,315 
cases to 212,774 cases. 
 
New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador temporary assistance caseloads saw the next 
largest decline in caseloads. Both of these provincial programs did not exempt the CERB. New 
Brunswick Transitional Benefit caseload fell by 12% between April 2020 and December 2020 




Figure 2: Percent Change in Temporary Assistance Caseloads Compared to April 2020, 
Deseasonalized data  
 
Note: data deseasonalized by authors.  
Sources: BC Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction (2021); Government of Alberta Open Data (2021); Ontario Ministry of 
Children, Community, and Social Services (2021); New Brunswick Ministry of Social Development (n.d.); Newfoundland and Labrador Ministry 
of Immigration, Skills, and Labour (n.d.). 
 
 
Finally, B.C.’s Temporary Assistance caseload fell by the least amount following receipt of the 
CERB. Recall that B.C. chose to fully exempt the CERB. The BC Temporary Assistance 
caseload fell by 6% between April 2020 and September 2020, from 49,361 cases to 46,228 cases.  
 
In Figure 3, there is very little change in disability assistance caseloads between April 2020 and 
October 2020. The largest decline was in Ontario for ODSP which fell by 1.5% from April 2020 
to August 2020.  
 
The fact that disability assistance caseloads did not see a large decline is not surprising. From 
Table 1, persons receiving disability assistance in B.C., Alberta, and Ontario who also received 
the CERB remained eligible for and continued to receive disability assistance. We also posit that 
because of the rule making CERB recipients who were not currently income assistance recipients 
ineligible for income assistance, this rule had a larger impact on temporary assistance than on 
disability assistance. Disability assistance is a long-term program, with recipients expected to 
continue receiving disability assistance for long periods of time, if not until they reach the age of  
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Figure 3: Percent Change in Disability Assistance Caseloads Compared to April 2020, 
Deseasonalized data 
 
Note: data deseasonalized by authors.  
Sources: BC Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction (2021); Government of Alberta Open Data (2021); Ontario Ministry of 
Children, Community, and Social Services (2021); New Brunswick Ministry of Social Development (n.d.). 
 
65 (when they transition onto OAS/GIS), compared to temporary assistance: in a given month, 
there are less in-flows into disability assistance programs than into temporary assistance 
programs. Thus, the receipt and treatment of CERB had a smaller effect on both exits and entry 
into disability assistance compared to temporary assistance. 
 
The decline observed in temporary assistance caseloads is also not surprising given how CERB 
interacted with temporary assistance programs. In Alberta and Ontario who partially exempted 
the CERB, this partial exemption would have reduced entries into temporary assistance and 
increased exits out of temporary assistance given that CERB receipt made Alberta Works and 
Ontario Works applicants and recipients ineligible for temporary assistance. Comparatively in 
B.C. where the CERB was fully exempt for current temporary assistance recipients, CERB 
should not have had much of an effect on exits, instead, it would have decreased entries. Using 
the data we have access to, we do see that in B.C. that there was a large decline in temporary 
assistance entries after the implementation of the CERB; however, there is also a slight increase 
in exits. We posit the increase in exists in B.C. was due to a stronger labour market in the 
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province due to the relaxing of COVID-19 restrictions that happened in June as well as the 
presence of the CERB, which continued to provide a safety net for those exiting income 
assistance and who might experience labour market disruptions if and when the pandemic 
reversed course.  
 
Finally, in both New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador where the CERB was not 
exempted, there was only moderate declines in temporary assistance caseloads. Without more 
detailed data, we can only provide conjectures as to why the decline in caseload in New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador was only moderate even though they did not 
exempt the CERB. The most likely reason is that, as Table 2 suggests, only a small proportion of 
income assistance recipients in New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador were 
potentially eligible for the CERB. Therefore, it is possible that less income assistance recipients 
qualified for the CERB in New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador than in provinces 
like Alberta and Ontario, resulting in CERB having a smaller effect on caseload exits in New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador than in Alberta and Ontario. A second plausible 
explanation as to why the change in caseload in New Brunswick and Newfoundland and 
Labrador was only moderate is that the Newfoundland and Labrador caseload data does not 
distinguish between temporary assistance and disability assistance. Since both streams are 
aggregated, it may be the case that for the Newfoundland and Labrador data, the decline in the 
temporary assistance caseload is being offset by a smaller decline in the disability assistance 
caseload.  
 
It is unlikely that the only moderate declines in temporary assistance caseloads in New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador was due to lower unemployment rates, less 
stringent lockdown measures or lower CERB take-up—any of which may have reduced the take-
up of CERB among existing and potential social assistance recipients. New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland and Labrador both had larger drops in employment than any of the other 
provinces examined and New Brunswick had more stringent lockdown measures than both 
Ontario and Alberta at some points in time (Sim and Breton 2020). In fact, both of these trends 
suggest that more persons in New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador should have 
taken up the CERB, including social assistance recipients, compared to Ontario and Alberta. 
However, when examining the CERB data, the number of unique recipients of CERB per 
working age population is relatively similar for New Brunswick and Newfoundland and 
Labrador compared to all other jurisdictions.  
 
Discussion 
Why was the CERB was treated differently across different jurisdictions and programs? That is, 
why did some income assistance programs treat CERB as employment income (with the 
corresponding earnings exemption and claw back rates), others treat it as “other income,” and yet 
others treat it as exempted other income? We proffer that, because of the swiftness with which 
the CERB was put into place, there was very little technical guidance as to what the CERB was: 
the federal government did not clarify whether the CERB was a replacement for earned 
(employment) income, a replacement for deferred earnings programs (e.g., Employment 
Insurance that was unable to cope with the surge in applications during the pandemic), or an 
income benefit program, paid out of general revenue to supplement low income.  
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There are a number of observations that can be made that result from the lack of clarity of the 
CERB. First, as we have implied elsewhere but which we now state directly, because the CERB 
was not clearly defined and thus treated differently across different income assistance programs, 
income assistance recipients were treated differently depending on where they lived. A recipient 
of Alberta Works and the CERB living in Canmore Alberta would be have been cut off of 
Alberta Works whereas a recipient of BC Temporary Assistance and the CERB living in Golden 
BC, less than three hours away from the Alberta Works recipient, would continue to receive both 
Temporary Assistance and the CERB. There does not appear to be justification for this 
difference in treatment. Indeed, a Manitoba Court of Appeal judge appears to agree that there is a 
lack of justification for this difference agreement in granting leave to appeal a case involving the 
clawback of the CERB from a person receiving income assistance in Manitoba (Cann v Director, 
Fort Garry/River Heights, 2020 MBCA 101 (CanLII) 2020).  
 
Second, because the CERB was not clearly defined, some provinces choose to offset some of 
their income assistance costs and shift them to the federal government, meaning the CERB 
program was used as a provincial fiscal policy tool rather than a social policy tool. The 
additional distributional shift was a (small) cost saving mechanism for the provinces at a (large 
individual) cost for some of the most vulnerable persons in the province:  it was a signal of how 
the provincial governments were approaching a health emergency that imposed a devasting 
economic toll on people.  
 
Finally, more broadly, this chapter demonstrates that a large reason for the complexity in the web 
of income and social support programs that are offered to Canadians is that new programs are 
often implemented without considering interactions with the existing suite of cross-government 
or cross-ministry programs. This can lead to unfortunate and unintended outcomes that actually 
reduce the effectiveness not only of the individual programs but also the suite of programs: it can 
reduce the ability of programs to reach their intended targets and can reduce the ability of 
government to achieve important goals such as poverty reduction and supporting transitions into 
paid work.  
 
In this case, the implementation of CERB legislation did not address its interactions with 
provincial/territorial income assistance programs. This jointly reduced the effectiveness of the 
CERB and income assistance in providing much-needed income supports to the most vulnerable 
populations during the pandemic.  
 
What broad lesson can be taken from this experience to improve policy outcomes in the future? 
Federal-provincial-territorial negotiations regarding how the subnational jurisdictions will treat 
federal income benefits in their programs has, to date, been approached in a one-off fashion, 
program by program. For example, before the implementation of the CCB, provinces were 
consulted by the federal government. During negotiations, the governments collaborated to avoid 
any “negative interactions” (McGregor 2016). Due to the required speed in the roll-out of the 
CERB, these types of negotiations were not able to be satisfactorily completed for the CERB. 
When normal closed-door negotiations fell through, the federal minister of employment, 
workforce development, and disability inclusion, Carla Qualtrough, requested through the media 
after the CERB was implemented that provincial income assistance programs not penalize those 
receiving the CERB and exempt the CERB in the same way the CCB is exempt (Monsebraaten 
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2020).  Clearly, this request was not heeded by many provincial/territorial income assistance 
programs.  
 
A different approach would be to negotiate a general framework that would be followed in all 
circumstances for all cash transfer programs. This framework would establish when and under 
what conditions income would be considered benefit income (akin to the CCB) and thus be fully 
exempted from income assistance income tests or earned income and thus partially exempt from 
income tests or other income (akin to Employment Insurance) and thus be not exempt from 
income tests. The federal government would then use this framework to set the type of income in 
the enabling legislation for the program. Having such a framework established and agreed upon a 
priori could then ensure in situations where time does not allow for detailed negotiations or 
political posturing can derail objectives, existing and new programs can be designed and 
implemented as intended, according to their objectives, and delivered consistently across 
Canada.  
 
In terms of administrative institutions in Canada that are intended to meet social need, it is 
important that policy and decision makers remember that social assistance recipients are amongst 
societies most vulnerable. Some (e.g., Boessenkool 2020) have argued that social assistance 
recipients should be treated no differently than any other low-income Canadians, but that 
guidance ignores the reality; social assistance recipients are different. Social assistance recipients 
are not just experiencing low income. In order to be assessed eligible for income assistance, they 
have had to satisfy a punishing set of eligibility criteria established for the sole purpose of 
keeping people out of the program. These eligibility criteria include proving they have very 
limited to no cash or other assets, no means of family support, and that they have exhausted all 
viable employment opportunities. Further, while many believe social assistance is used as an 
emergency stop-gap for individuals experiencing a temporary job separation, provincial caseload 
trends show that social assistance is more and more becoming a program for persons with 
disabilities and long-term barriers to employment. Petit and Tedds (2020b) show that in B.C., 
persons with disabilities plus persons with persistent and multiple barriers to employment make 
up over 73% of the total social assistance caseload.  Those with persistent and multiple barriers 
to employment include those with mental health conditions and addictions, and those escaping 
intimate partner violence who have suffered a traumatic brain injury—factors which themselves 
should be considered disabilities.  
 
Policy decisions, regardless of whether they are made by the federal government or 
provincial/territorial governments, that affect social assistance recipients should reflect this 
reality. Yet too often, as evidenced by the decision taken by many provinces regarding the 
CERB, social assistance recipients are treated with immense stigma. Voluminous research (see 
Petit and Tedds 2021b for a summary) shows that this stigma not only prevents those in need 
from accessing the support they need, but it also results in program conditions that trap recipients 
in poverty.  
 
The differential decision of how to treat the CERB for the purposes of provincial income 
assistance is likely to have long-run impacts on social assistance caseloads. The CERB was an 
opportunity to provide to those receiving income assistance benefits a chance to save money. 
The building up of assets is a necessary pre-condition for self-sufficiency (Robson 2008) and 
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may reduce dependency on income assistance, allowing recipients to permanently leave income 
assistance. Thus, the jurisdictions that exempted the CERB may see more reduced dependency 
on income assistance amongst affected recipients compared to jurisdictions that chose to partially 
or not exempt the CERB. Policy makers across Canada should carefully watch this trend and use 
the resulting evidence to change income support programs. 
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